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We propose a theory of communicative interactions based on 
the idea that it is constitutive of interpersonal communication 
to create and manage a fragment of social reality. We define 
such a fragment in terms of joint commitments of the 
interactants, and analyze how these commitments are made in 
a conversation. We distinguish between three layers of joint 
commitments: those that regulate the embedding activity of 
the conversation; those that constitute the joint meaning of 
communicative acts; and those that concern the target of the 
conversation. We argue that joint commitments are created in 
a concrete situation by producing and negotiating interper-
sonal affordances, which allows the interactants to retain 
suitable freedom of movement. Finally, we analyze some 
relationships between our conception of communicative acts 
and illocutionary acts. 
Keywords: Interpersonal communication; communicative 
act; interpersonal reality; joint commitment; joint meaning. 
Introduction 
Fifty years since the publication of Austin’s How to Do 
Things with Words (1962), the idea that human communica-
tion is to be regarded as a form of action has gained univer-
sal acceptance. However, there are reasons to doubt that 
Speech Act Theory (as developed, among others, by Searle, 
1969; Schiffer, 1972; Bach & Harnish, 1979; and Alston, 
2000) provides an adequate treatment of real communicative 
interactions. Reasons for skepticism have been put forward, 
for example, by Levinson (1981), Clark (1996), and Mey 
(2001); Mey, in particular, proposes to replace the notions 
of illocutionary and perlocutionary acts of Speech Act The-
ory with that of a pragmatic act, understood as the situated 
performance of a concrete act of communication. 
As of today, no situated approach to communication can 
boast the generality and depth of Speech Act Theory. It may 
be argued that attaining such a result is an impossible mis-
sion, insofar as a situated standpoint is by its very nature 
sensitive to concrete particulars, which clashes with the 
quest for generality; nevertheless, we believe that significant 
results can be achieved by suitably choosing the theory’s 
‘field of view.’ In the attempt to move forward in this direc-
tion, in this paper we confine our interest to processes of 
interpersonal communication, aiming to clarify: (i), what 
concept of a situation is suited for dealing with interpersonal 
communication; and (ii), what relationships hold between 
the performance of a single act of interpersonal communica-
tion, the interaction process to which the act belongs, and 
the situation in which such an interaction is couched.  
Our approach is centered on a normative concept, namely, 
joint commitment. The importance of normative concepts in 
general, and of commitment in particular, has been high-
lighted in various areas of research related to human com-
munication, like dialogue theory (Hamblin, 1970; Walton & 
Krabbe, 1995), philosophy of language (Brandom, 1994; 
Alston, 2000; Searle, 2010), and computer-based interaction 
(Winograd & Flores, 1986). Nevertheless, the foundational 
role of commitment in theories of communication is still 
insufficiently appreciated. At least in part this may be due to 
the fact that, as remarked by Harnish (2005), we still lack a 
widely accepted treatment of commitment, comparable to 
the theories of epistemic and volitional mental states, like 
belief, desire, and intention. 
We found, however, that a theory of commitment suitable 
for our goals is offered in the work of Margaret Gilbert 
(1989, 1996, 2000, 2006). We rely on Gilbert’s concept of 
joint commitment to define interpersonal reality as a major 
component of a social situation. In our view interpersonal 
communication functions as the main source of interper-
sonal reality, through the creation and management of suit-
able affordances; this approach leads us to propose a novel 
point of view on several fundamental concepts related to 
communicative action, like meaning and uptake. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we 
introduce a concept of interpersonal communication and 
present our view of a situation, with particular regard to its 
interpersonal component, based on the concept of joint 
commitment. In the following section we give a concise 
introduction to joint commitment. Subsequently we deline-
ate a theory of communicative acts, and then analyze some 
relationships between communicative acts, and speech acts 
as conceived in Speech Act Theory. Finally we draw some 
conclusions and describe directions for further research. 
The Social Situation 
We take interpersonal communication to be a form of com-
munication between individual selves. By this we mean that 
interpersonal communication is ‘person-to-person’ (rather 
than in broadcast, like in the case of mass communication), 
strongly related to the personal identity of the interactants 
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and to the interpersonal relationship holding between them, 
and only marginally sensitive to institutionalized roles (con-
trary to the case of institutional communication). 
Interpersonal communication can take place in a variety 
of settings, like for example face-to-face conversations, 
phone conversations, mail exchanges, or interactions 
through online social networks. In this paper we concentrate 
on the basic setting (Clark, 1996), to wit, face-to-face con-
versations; moreover, for the sake of simplicity we shall 
confine to conversations involving two agents. 
Interpersonal communication typically occurs in the con-
text of some embedding activity (Bunt, 1998), jointly carried 
out by the interactants, like for example making dinner, sail-
ing a ship, or writing a paper together. In the limiting case 
of a pure conversation, the whole embedding activity coin-
cides with the communication process. The embedding ac-
tivity is a major component of the global situation, in which 
interpersonal communication is couched. Intuitively, we can 
think of the global situation as the set of all states of affairs 
which affect, or are affected by, the interaction. Such states 
of affairs (be they physical, psychological, or social) func-
tion as resources and constraints for action, and often are 
themselves the result of the ongoing activity. 
At every moment, a situation presents a range of affor-
dances (Gibson, 1979; Norman, 1988; Carassa et al., 2005), 
that is, of action possibilities that are perceived by the 
agents. To a large extent, agents carry out an interaction by 
exploiting the affordances offered by the current situation, 
and by creating new affordances for further exploitation. It 
is important to remark that the global situation cannot be 
identified with the externally observable, spatio-temporal 
slice of the world in which the interaction takes place: the 
mental representations of the interactants typically bring 
into relevance states of affairs that are far away in time and 
space, like for example significant events belonging to pre-
vious interactions. 
In our analysis we concentrate on the social component of 
the global situation, which we call the social situation More 
precisely, we take the social situation to consist of social 
reality, understood as the collective acceptance or recogni-
tion of deontic powers, like obligations, rights, and so on 
(Searle, 2010). Our definition is justified by various reasons, 
and in particular by the fact that the social situation: (i), is 
amenable to a general theoretical treatment; (ii), accounts 
for a remarkable variety of communicative phenomena; and 
(iii), presents interesting dynamics, in that it both affects, 
and is continually modified by, communicative action.  
It is useful to distinguish between two roughly disjoint 
components of social reality: (i), superpersonal reality, con-
stituted by the deontic powers attributed to an agent by a 
superpersonal entity (like society at large, a legislature, an 
organization, etc.), and typically associated to the roles 
played by the agent within some institutional structure; and 
(ii), interpersonal reality, constituted by the deontic powers 
informally created by people for themselves in everyday 
interactions. Both types of social reality involve deontic 
powers, but there is an important difference: with superper-
sonal reality, the agents typically recognize certain deontic 
powers that they did not contribute to create; on the con-
trary, interpersonal deontic powers are created by the very 
same agents who are bound by them. 
As far as interpersonal reality is concerned, we submit 
that the creation and maintenance of deontic powers is based 
on joint commitments, that are negotiated by the relevant 
agents through communicative action (Carassa & Colom-
betti, 2009c). In the next section we provide an introduction 
to the concept of joint commitment, mainly based on the 
work of Margaret Gilbert (in particular 1996, Part III; 2000, 
Chapter 4; and 2006, Chapter 7). 
Joint Commitment 
According to Gilbert, all genuinely collective phenomena 
(like joint activities, collective beliefs, group feelings, social 
conventions, and so on) involve a special kind of commit-
ment, namely, a joint commitment. An agent may be person-
ally committed to do X, for example as a result of an indi-
vidual decision: such a decision may be rescinded, but fail-
ing this the agent is committed to do X. Being committed to 
do X is a desire-independent reason (although in general not 
a sufficient cause) for the agent to do X; however, in the 
personal case the agent is the only ‘owner’ of the commit-
ment, and can rescind it as he or she pleases. Contrary to 
personal commitments, a joint commitment is a commit-
ment of two or more agents, called the parties of the joint 
commitment, to engage in a common project ‘as a single 
body.’ The main difference between personal and joint 
commitments is that a joint commitment is not separately 
owned by its parties, but is, so to speak, collectively owned 
by all the parties at the same time.  
According to Gilbert, to establish a joint commitment to 
do X it is necessary and sufficient that every party expresses 
his or her readiness to be so committed, in conditions of 
common knowledge; such common knowledge may derive 
from an explicit agreement, but also from less structured 
interactions and, in many cases, from the shared understand-
ing of a culturally meaningful context. 
In view of the purpose of this article, the main feature of 
joint commitments is that they consist of deontic relation-
ships between the parties. If a group is jointly committed to 
do something, then every party is obligated to all other par-
ties to do their part, and has the right that all other parties do 
their parts. It is characteristic of joint commitments that 
such obligations are created simultaneously, when the joint 
commitment comes into force, and are interdependent, in 
the sense that each party is bound by the joint commitment 
only as long as the other parties are so bound. If and when 
all its obligations are fulfilled, a joint commitment is itself 
fulfilled; on the contrary, if one of its obligations is violated, 
the whole joint commitment is violated; as remarked by 
Gilbert (1996), violation by a party typically implies that the 
joint commitment becomes voidable by the other parties. 
Moreover, the obligations of a joint commitment are persis-
tent, in the sense that they do not expire unless the joint 
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commitment is fulfilled or re-negotiated. Thanks to their 
persistence, joint commitments appear to exert a crucial 
function in human interaction, in that they provide collec-
tively accepted desire-independent reasons for action, and 
thus make the future behavior of agents more stable and 
predictable. 
The content of a joint commitment need not be an activ-
ity: a group of agents may also commit to a propositional 
attitude, like a belief or a desire, or to a value, a feeling, and 
so on; for example, the members of the Flat Earth Society 
are jointly committed to believing that the Earth is flat, and 
the components of a sports team are jointly committed to be 
proud of their victories. It is important to remark that all 
commitments, irrespective of their contents, are desire-
independent reasons for action, and as such have a world-to-
mind direction of fit. This is obvious for a commitment to 
do something, but may sound odd, for instance, in the case 
of a commitment to a belief. The reason is that in the case of 
an action commitment, both the commitment and its content 
have the same direction of fit, namely, world-to-mind; but 
in the case of a commitment to a belief, the commitment has 
a world-to-mind direction of fit, while its content has a 
mind-to-world direction of fit. This apparent conflict van-
ishes if one thinks that all types of commitments entail obli-
gations, which in turn give a crucial contribution to the for-
mation of intentions. For example, suppose that Ann is a 
member of the Flat Earth Society; then, to fulfill her join 
commitment, she ought to behave in certain ways, like refer-
ring to the North Pole as “the center of the Earth.” 
Joint commitments to beliefs (that following Gilbert, 
1987, we call collective beliefs) play a key role in our theory 
of interpersonal communication. A collective belief that p 
(i.e., the joint commitment of a group to uphold as a body 
the belief that p) should not be confused with what is usu-
ally called common or mutual belief. Both collective and 
common beliefs are ‘distributed’ mental states, in the sense 
that they require all the members of a group to entertain 
certain mental states; there are, however, important differ-
ences between the two concepts. The first such difference is 
that a collective belief, being a joint commitment, is a 
source of obligations and rights; more precisely, if p is col-
lective belief of group G, then every member of G is obli-
gated to all other members to act as if p were common belief 
of G, and has the right against all other members of G that 
they behave accordingly. A further difference is that collec-
tive beliefs, contrary to common beliefs, are logically inde-
pendent of what the relevant agents personally believe. As a 
limiting case, it is logically possible for a group of agents to 
hold the collective belief that p, while it is common belief of 
the same group that not-p. However, if a group of agents 
collectively believe that p, then all members of the group are 
obligated to behave as if p were common belief of the group 
(a situation that is well portrayed by Andersen’s story of the 
Naked King).  
Communicative Acts 
Our approach takes the move from the following assump-
tions: (i), interpersonal communication is a situated activity, 
by which a group of agents create and manage a fragment of 
interpersonal reality; (ii), such interpersonal reality consists 
of those deontic powers that are collectively accepted by the 
very agents engaged in the interaction; (iii), collective ac-
ceptance consists of joint commitments of the same agents. 
As we have already pointed out, in this paper we restrict our 
treatment to face-to-face conversations involving two inter-
actants, A and B. In the sequel we sketch the overall scheme 
of our theory. 
Layers of interpersonal reality  Interpersonal communica-
tion involves three layers of interpersonal reality (Carassa & 
Colombetti, 2009c). As we shall see, the bottom layer con-
sists of the joint commitments of A and B concerning the 
current activity, which embeds the communicative interac-
tion (and actually coincides with it, in the case of a pure 
conversation); the middle layer involves the construction of 
joint meaning, that is, the creation of joint commitments to 
the effect that certain communicative acts have been per-
formed; and the top layer involves joint commitments con-
cerning the target of the interaction.  
Let us consider a real example of a pure conversation:1 
(1a) A: Can I ask you something? 
(1b) B: Sure. 
(2a) A: Are you planning to get any stuff from Amazon 
shortly? 
(2b) B: Not really. 
(3a) A. There are a couple of books I need. 
(3b) B: [in a slightly teasing tone] Ok, just send me the 
data. 
(4a) A: Oh, thanks! 
(4b) B: You’re welcome, dear. 
This exchange consists of a sequence of utterances, orga-
nized as four adjacency pairs, that we shall now analyze in 
details. 
Setting up the embedding activity  As we have already 
pointed out, we regard interpersonal reality as consisting of 
joint commitments. According to Gilbert, to make a joint 
commitment to X it is necessary and sufficient that A and B 
express their readiness to be so committed, in conditions of 
common knowledge. A first observation is that while a joint 
commitment binds its parties simultaneously, the process of 
creating the joint commitment is typically incremental, as it 
is highly improbable that all the parties express their readi-
ness at the same time. Typically one of the agents, say A, 
will start expressing readiness, thus making what we call a 
precommitment. This precommitment functions as an inter-
personal affordance for B, who may ignore it, express a 
matching readiness (thus transforming A’s precommitment 
                                                           
1  Free translation from Italian. A and B are in the same room, 
working independently at their laptops; it is common practice of 
A and B that B carries out online purchases for A. 
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into a full-blown joint commitment of A and B), or deal 
with it otherwise. 
A first example of this is pair 1a-1b. By utterance 1a, A 
expresses her readiness to engage in a conversational ex-
change with B, and this creates for B the interpersonal af-
fordance to set up a conversation with A. B can now exploit 
such an affordance in different ways. A first possibility 
would be to ignore A’s precommitment, and just keep silent: 
(1b’) B: – 
Another possibility for B is to acknowledge A’s precom-
mitment, while refusing to turn it into a joint commitment; 
this result could be achieved, for example, by answering: 
(1b”) B: Not now, please, I’m in a hurry here.  
Third, B can acknowledge A’s precommitment, and ac-
cept to turn it into a joint commitment of A and B to engage 
in a conversation together, and this is what B does by utter-
ing 1b. Such a joint commitment entails certain mutual 
rights and obligations, like the right to address further com-
municative acts to the other party, and the obligation to par-
ticipate in the construction of joint meaning and in the nego-
tiation of the target (see the following subsections). Note 
that even if B, by uttering 1b”, would reject A’s precom-
mitment to set up a conversation, he would still implicitly 
acknowledge that he construed utterance 1a as creating such 
a precommitment, thus implying that joint meaning of 1a 
has been achieved; this would not be the case with response 
1b’ (silence). 
It is important to remark that our treatment does not aim 
to provide a comparative evaluation of responses like 1b, 
1b’, and 1b”, for example relative to a system of conversa-
tional rules. Indeed, keeping silent (like in 1b’) would be 
considered inappropriate in most conversational situations; 
but this has to do with what we have called superpersonal 
reality, that is, with the normativity that is externally im-
posed on the current social situation. What we try to clarify, 
on the contrary, is what different responses actually contrib-
ute to the creation and maintenance of interpersonal reality, 
that is, to the normativity that is built by the interactants 
within the current situation. 
Creating joint meaning  Meaning is a highly controversial 
topic. For most speech act theorists, what an agent means by 
an utterance depends on their communicative intention, in-
dependently of what the addressee understands, and even of 
the actual existence of an addressee; for other, more so-
cially-minded, theorists, meaning is in some important sense 
jointly constructed by the speaker and the addressee. In a 
previous paper (Carassa & Colombetti, 2009a) we have pro-
posed to dissolve this apparent conflict of views by distin-
guishing between speaker’s meaning, which is a function of 
the speaker’s communicative intention, and joint meaning, 
which is collectively constructed by the speaker and the 
addressee. The joint meaning of an utterance, addressed by 
A to B, is the joint commitment of A and B to uphold as a 
body the belief that A’s utterance has been produced with a 
given communicative intention. This implies that joint 
meaning is to be regarded as the collective belief of the 
speaker and the addressee, to the effect that a certain com-
municative act has been performed. 
Going back to our example, we can notice that an utter-
ance often gives an implicit contribution to the construction 
of joint meaning of previous utterances. After pair 2a-2b, it 
is still not established that 2a is meant by A as a pre-request, 
related to the target of getting some books from Amazon. 
But that this is the case becomes clear after 3a-3b; more 
precisely, utterance 3b: (i), implies that B construed 3a as an 
indirect request, and 2a as a related pre-request; (ii), con-
veys acceptance of the request; and (iii), suggests a way of 
carrying out the joint project that is now understood to be 
the target of the conversation. A different construal would 
be put forward, for example, by a response like: 
(3b’) B: Try Amazon Italy, delivery is free.  
Like in the case discussed in the previous subsection 
(concerning the joint action of setting up an embedding ac-
tivity), also joint meaning is built by the speaker’s creation 
of an interpersonal affordance, which can be exploited by 
the addressee to complete the construction of a joint com-
mitment. This view is especially useful to deal with indirect 
speech; for example, A’s utterance 3a creates affordances 
for B to interpret it in different ways: as an indirect request 
to buy some books for A; as an indirect request to put the 
speaker in condition of buying the books herself; as a mere 
expression of a wish; and so on. By response 3b, B offers to 
A an interpretation of 3a as a request to buy some books for 
her (and, by the same utterance, B accepts such a request). 
Then, by 4a, A implicitly accepts B’s construal; but note 
that at this stage A still has the possibility of suggesting a 
different interpretation, for example by saying, 
(4a’) A: I think I can manage it, I just wanted to know if 
you want to add something to my order.  
An addressee’s contribution to the construction of joint 
meaning is obviously related to Austin’s concept of uptake. 
In the Speech Act literature, uptake has been either com-
pletely neglected, or at most considered as the addressee’s 
epistemic recognition of an intended illocutionary act. On 
the contrary, we advocate a normative concept of uptake, as 
the addressee’s contribution to the construction of joint 
meaning, understood as a piece of interpersonal reality. 
Such a contribution we call interpersonal uptake.  
Negotiating the target  At the third layer of interpersonal 
reality, the target of the communicative interaction is nego-
tiated. Also at this layer we understand interaction as the 
production of interpersonal affordances in the form of pre-
commitments, which the addressee may ignore, accept (and 
thus transform into full-blown joint commitments), refuse, 
or otherwise negotiate. In our example, the target concerns 
B buying some books for A from Amazon. But that this is 
the case is fully established only with utterance 4a, where A 
accepts B’s construal of 3a as an indirect request. All utter-
ances preceding 4a provide relevant affordances in this di-
rection, but still leave the interactants some freedom of 
movement. 
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The concept of freedom of movement is crucial to under-
stand why communicative interactions are carried out by 
creating and managing affordances at different layers of 
interpersonal reality (Carassa & Colombetti, 2009b). In the 
last resort, what is at stake is negotiating the target: in our 
example, A has the personal goal of getting B to buy certain 
books for her; but this goal could also be achieved through a 
direct request, like for example: 
(2a’) A: Please buy me a few books from Amazon, I’ll 
send you the data.  
A first observation is that a direct request of this tenor 
conveys a presumption of authority of A over B, that would 
be inappropriate in the relevant social situation. This ex-
plains why A is willing to leave B some freedom of move-
ment at the target layer, but is still insufficient to fully un-
derstand our example; indeed, the same result could be 
achieved by a direct request that explicitly acknowledges 
B’s right to refuse, like:  
(2a”) A: I need a few books. You may buy them for me 
from Amazon, if you want.  
The problem with such a request is that it leaves B two al-
ternatives: accepting the request, which B may not want to 
do, or refusing it, which may be embarrassing. What we see 
in our example, instead, is that the locus of negotiation is 
moved from the target layer to the layer of joint meaning: 
after 3a, B is still free to construe it as an indirect request of 
buying the books for A, or in a different way, like for exam-
ple as a weaker request of assistance (see 3b’). 
It is important to clarify that the target (i.e., B’s concrete 
action of buying some books for A) is not part of the present 
situation: B’s action will be performed at some future mo-
ment, after the current interaction has been terminated (by 
pair 4a-4b). On the contrary, the joint commitment of A and 
B, to the effect that such an action will be carried out, is part 
of the present situation, as it is here that the commitment is 
created. Interestingly, the commitment does not expire when 
the current interaction is terminated: as we have already 
remarked, the temporal persistence of joint commitments is 
essential to their function of making the future conse-
quences of an interaction adequately stable and predictable. 
Communicative vs. Speech Acts 
Given the impact of Speech Act Theory on theories of 
communication, it is meaningful to confront a novel concep-
tion of a communicative act with that of a speech act. Here 
we shall consider four aspects related to Speech Act Theory: 
(i), the distinction between illocution and perlocution; (ii), 
the controversy between normativistic and naturalistic ap-
proaches; (iii), the distinction between communicative and 
conventional acts; and (iv), the treatment of indirect speech. 
Illocution and perlocution  Our treatment of communica-
tive acts situates itself at the illocutionary level. While this 
is obvious for the joint meaning layer, it may seem that the 
target layer is concerned with perlocution. But this is not the 
case, as we do not examine the mental processes that lead an 
addressee, for example, to accept or refuse a request; rather, 
we analyze how acceptance or refusal is made public 
through communication, and this concerns illocution. 
In any case, our treatment of illocution departs from clas-
sical Speech Act Theory, in that we are interested in how 
the illocutionary force of an utterance is collectively con-
structed as a matter of joint meaning. A consequence is that 
communicative acts cannot be studied in isolation, but only 
in the flow of conversation. 
Normativistic vs. naturalistic approaches  Harnish (2005) 
contrasts normativistic and naturalistic theories of speech 
acts. According to the former (originated by Austin, 1962, 
and mainly developed by Searle, 1969, and Alston, 2000), 
to perform an illocutionary act is to produce an utterance in 
conformance with certain constitutive rules; according to the 
latter (mainly developed by Schiffer, 1972, and Bach & 
Harnish, 1979), to perform an illocutionary act is to produce 
an utterance with a reflexive communicative intention, 
which includes its own recognition by the addressee in its 
conditions of satisfaction. 
It seems to us that our approach overcomes this opposi-
tion by recognizing the crucial importance of the normative 
dimension of communicative acts, but reducing it to a per-
fectly natural phenomenon, that is, the human cognitive 
ability to make joint commitments (see Carassa & Colom-
betti, 2009a, for a preliminary analysis of the role of reflex-
ive communicative intentions in the creation of joint com-
mitments). 
Communicative vs. conventional acts  According to nor-
mativistic theories, there is no essential difference between, 
say, asking a favor and pronouncing two persons man and 
wife: in both cases, an illocutionary act is performed in con-
formance with certain constitutive rules. Naturalistic theo-
ries, on the contrary, deal differently with the two types of 
illocutionary acts, because the addressee’s recognition of the 
communicative intention is crucial in the former case, but 
not in the latter. This introduces a sharp distinction between 
communicative and conventional acts, as first proposed by 
Strawson (1964). In our view, the difference between these 
two types of illocutionary acts is related to the two kinds of 
social reality, that is, interpersonal reality (for communica-
tive acts) and superpersonal reality (for conventional acts). 
What is at stake, then, is not so much a difference between 
types of illocutionary acts, but rather a difference between 
types of social situations. In the future, we plan to extend 
our treatment to conventional acts including superpersonal 
reality in our treatment of the social situation.  
Indirect illocutionary acts  In Speech Act Theory, an ut-
terance like 3a is usually analyzed as realizing both a literal 
illocutionary act of the assertive type, and an indirect illocu-
tionary act of the directive type. The inference from the lit-
eral to the indirect interpretation can be accounted for in 
terms of conversational implicature (Searle, 1975).  
It is by no means obvious, however, that such a treatment 
provides a satisfactory view of what goes on in a real con-
versation. In uttering 3a, for example, even A may not be 
completely clear about her own communicative intention: is 
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she intentionally requesting B to buy the books for her, or is 
she suggesting that buying the books would be nice of B, or 
is she just presenting a state of affairs to B, in the hope that 
B will somehow help her? Not only this cannot be estab-
lished by simply scrutinizing A’s utterance; more impor-
tantly, A need not have a fully definite communicative in-
tention: what A actually does is to create an interpersonal 
affordance for B to participate in the collective construction 
of joint meaning. If we are right on this, the classical theory 
of indirect illocutionary acts should be replaced by a differ-
ent view, which highlights the power of situated communi-
cative acts to create and manage interpersonal affordances at 
all layers of interpersonal communication (Carassa & Co-
lombetti, 2009b). 
Conclusions 
We have argued that interpersonal communication is 
basically a matter of creating and managing a fragment of 
interpersonal reality. We dealt with interpersonal reality in 
terms of joint commitments, and analyzed how these are 
created in conversation. We distinguished between three 
layers of joint commitments, and argued that at each layer 
the relevant joint commitments are made by producing and 
negotiating interpersonal affordances in a concrete social 
situation, so that the interactants can retain suitable freedom 
of movement. 
We believe that recognizing the central role of joint 
commitment in human interaction involves a crucial en-
largement of the classical view of human cognition. Indeed, 
it is interesting to see that important contributions in this 
direction are being produced by empirically oriented re-
search on the origin of human communication and coopera-
tion (Tomasello, 2008; Gräfenhain et al., 2009). 
In the future, we plan to develop our approach in two 
main directions: first, by extending our treatment to 
communicative interactions that are significantly affected by 
elements of superpersonal social reality, thus covering 
communication in institutional contexts; second, by 
providing a more articulated account of joint commitment, 
with the aim of showing how to extend the classical 
conceptual toolkit of Cognitive Science, in order to deal 
with the intrinsically normative nature of human 
interactions. 
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